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Language disguises thought. So much so, that from the outward form of the clothing 
it is impossible to infer the form of the thought beneath it, because the outward form 
of the clothing is not designed to reveal the form of the body, but for entirely different 
purposes. (Wittgenstein 1974, 4.002) 
 
1  Introduction 
Semantic generalists and semantic particularists disagree over the role of rules or 
principles in linguistic competence and in the determination of linguistic meaning, 
and hence over the importance of the notions of a rule or of a principle in 
philosophical accounts of language. Elsewhere, I have argued that the particularist’s 
case against generalism is far from decisive and that by moderating the claims she 
makes on behalf of her thesis the generalist can accommodate many of the 
considerations that the particularist cites in support of her position.
1 In a recent 
article,
2 and in part in response to my work, Anna Bergqvist tries to strengthen the 
cases against generalism and for particularism. While there is much that I admire in 
Bergqvist’s careful and considered discussion—and while I share Bergqvist’s sense 
that the gap between particularism and generalism, though real and important, is not 
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large—I am ultimately not convinced by her arguments. In this paper, I shall explain 
why and, in doing so, take the opportunity to clarify further what the generalist is, or 
should be, committed to.  
 
2  Parts and wholes 
Generalism is a thesis in the theory of linguistic meaning, one which suggests a 
corresponding thesis in the theory of linguist understanding. According to generalism, 
very roughly, the meaning of an expression is determined by general rules governing 
its use; hence, understanding an expression is a matter of grasping the rules for its use. 
One might expect particularism to involve a rejection of the generalist’s claim 
that the meaning of a term is determined by a general rule for its employment. 
Surprisingly, however, the particularist seems to accept this and take it to show that 
expressions do not have meanings! As Bergqvist says, ‘there just is no such thing as 
the invariant core meaning of a term’ (p. 3). Of course, the particularist does not really 
think that expressions are entirely bereft of significance; rather, the suggestion is that 
the kind of significance they have is not the kind that the generalist has in mind. What 
an expression has, Bergqvist tells us, is a kind of meaning only possessed in 
‘particular contexts of use’ (p. 3);
3 correspondingly, what an expression lacks is an 
‘invariant’ meaning. (Since ‘invariant’ suggests that such meaning does not change—
and since an important part of revealing generalism to be a defensible position 
involves recognising that such change can and does occur—I prefer to talk of a 
‘context-independent’ meaning, one that is not inextricably tied to a particular 
occasion of utterance.) 
So, the dispute comes to this. Generalists claim that expressions possess 
context-independent meanings, of the sort that might be determined by context-
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independent rules which are brought to bear on particular occasions, while 
particularists deny this. Bergqvist presents this as a dispute over the following: 
Atomism  every meaningful term is such that it would make the 
same contribution to the meaning of any complex 
expression of which it may be a part (in any context).  
According to Bergqvist, ‘semantic particularism amounts to […] the denial of 
atomism’ (p. 7). In rejecting that thesis, particularists advance the following: 
Holism  every meaningful term is such that it can make different 
contributions to the meaning of any complex expression of 
which it may be part (in different contexts).
4 
So far, so good. The trickier issue is what the generalist’s position is with respect to 
the above theses, which turns on what is to be understood by the ‘meaning’ of a 
complex expression as it occurs in each formulation. According to Bergqvist, she uses 
‘the terms “meaning”, “semantic purport”’, “thought”, “content”, and “what is said” 
interchangeably’ (p. 2 fn 1). Thus, a ‘meaning’ in Bergqvist’s sense is a truth-
evaluable proposition or thought expressed in the use of a sentence. In light of this, 
one can reformulate the relevant theses as follows: 
Atomism*  every meaningful term is such that it would make the 
same contribution to the thought expressed by (the 
utterance) of any complex expression of which it may 
be a part (in any context).  
Holism*  every meaningful term is such that it can make different 
contributions to the thought expressed by (the utterance 
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of) any complex expression of which it may be part (in 
different contexts). 
The particularist’s rejection of atomism* in favour of holism* is typically 
based on reflection on particular examples.
5 Consider: 
(1)  The twelve-year old is tall. 
(2)  The professional basketball player is tall. 
What it takes for the predicate ‘is tall’ to have been correctly applied in each case 
appears to differ. The relevant person’s being two metres in height might be a reason 
for applying it in one case but not the other. It is in this sense that the ‘contribution’ a 
term makes is determined in part by what other expressions it is combined with on a 
given occasion—what is expressed by ‘is tall’, what being tall amounts to, appears to 
differ in different contexts. 
  Similar considerations arguably apply to whole sentences. The same sentence 
might make different ‘contributions’, i.e. express different thoughts, in different 
contexts. Consider: 
(3)  Milk is in the fridge. 
Suppose that David utters (3) and that, on opening the fridge, Kelly finds only a few 
drops of milk on a shelf. Whether Kelly should evaluate what David said in uttering 
(3) as true or false, and so what he said, arguably depends on whether he uttered it in 
response, say, to her asking if the fridge was clean or her asking whether there is 
enough milk for cereal. Depending on the context, in uttering (3) David might have 
expressed different things. Although in each context the words uttered are the same—
as, in one sense, is the state of the fridge—what it takes for what is said to be true or 
false, what milk’s being in the fridge amounts to, differs (and with it what is said).  
                                                 
5 For a comprehensive defence of holism*, see Travis 1989 and Travis 2008. The example involving (3) 
below is an adaptation of one of Travis’s.   5 
  Insofar as it is straightforward to see how one might tell stories such as those 
sketched above for virtually any expression in a language, so the argument goes, 
holism* seems to be true. Of course, one might not find these considerations 
especially forceful but, with the particularist, I shall accept them. While I do not doubt 
that many advance a form of generalism incompatible with it, generalism is not as 
such incompatible with holism*. 
  Recall that the generalist claims that expressions have context-independent 
meanings. A generalist need not, however, view the meaning of an expression—
which, she claims, is determined by rules of use—as truth-evaluable, as a thought or 
proposition; instead, she could view the meaning of an expression as a kind of 
context-independent significance in virtue of which it can be used on a given occasion 
to express a particular thought. On this account, the meaning of a sentence is a kind of 
schema or template for thought, not a thought proper, which constrains but does not 
determine what thought is expressed in its use. Correlatively, the meaning of a word 
plays a part in constraining but not determining what is expressed in its utterance. 
  Hence, returning to holism*, a generalist can surely accept that the same 
expression might express different things—make different ‘contributions’—in 
different contexts of utterance. Her claim that those expressions have context-
independent meanings determined by general rules of use is not at odds with this, 
since the meanings they possess are not to be identified with what is expressed. On 
this generalist view, it is both necessary and sufficient for a word to possess a given 
meaning that its use be governed by rules but having such a context-independent 
meaning, and so being governed by rules, might only be necessary and not also 
sufficient for a sentence involving it to express a particular thought on a given 
occasion. The extra work, the generalist that accepts holism* can allow, is done by the 
context.     6 
It is to Bergqvist’s credit that she recognises a form of generalism that allows 
for the ‘sort of context-sensitivity in the theory of meaning’ that holists* call attention 
to (p. 8). Following Bergqvist, I shall call this ‘moderate generalism’. Unfortunately, 
having registered this position, Bergqvist seems quickly to lose sight of it. Consider: 
Semantic particularism claims that questions about what semantic contribution the 
presence of a word can make to the meaning of the sentence, utterance or phrase of 
which it is a part—what the relevant sentence or utterance says—can only be 
answered in context. (p. 10) 
On this, particularists and generalists need not disagree. An expression has a context-
independent meaning fixed by general rules of use, says the generalist, but this 
meaning does not determine (though it does constrain) what is expressed in its use in 
a given context (i.e. the ‘meaning’ in Bergqvist’s sense). 
Bergqvist seems to overlook moderate generalism again when she suggests 
that the dispute between particularists and generalists concerns the following:  
Strong compositionality   the meaning of a complex expression is determined by 
the meanings of its parts, and their mode of composition, 
and  its  parts  would  make  the  same  semantic 
contribution  to  any  other  complex  expression  in  any 
other context.
  
According to Bergqvist, what distinguishes particularism from generalism is the 
former’s claim ‘that there just is no invariant core meaning of the sort that advocates 
of strong compositionality assume’ (p. 8). However, consider again the relevant thesis, 
formulated so as to make explicit how ‘meaning’ is to be understood in this context: 
Strong compositionality*   the thought expressed by (the utterance of) a complex 
expression is determined by the meanings of its parts, 
and  their  mode  of  composition,  and  its  parts  would   7 
make  the  same  semantic  contribution  in  any  other 
context.
  
Surely, in rejecting atomism* in favour of holism*, the generalist should reject strong 
compositionality*. For the moderate generalist, the meaning of a complex expression 
is determined by the context-independent meanings of its parts, and hence by the 
context-independent rules governing them, but the meaning of the complex 
expression, in the relevant sense, underdetermines what is expressed in its utterance. 
A particular thought is expressed by a meaningful expression, according to moderate 
generalism, only given an appropriate context. 
So, Bergqvist is right to insist that the debate between particularists and 
moderate generalists is not over holism; by the same token, however, it is not over 
strong compositionality either. What the debate comes down to is, again, whether 
expressions can be said to have context-independent meanings of the sort that might 
be fixed by context-independent rules for their employment.
6 
 
3  Defaults and standards 
It is worth noting that, having insisted that terms do not have context-independent 
meanings but only meanings on occasions of use, Bergqvist grants on behalf of the 
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  For some critical discussion of Davidson’s views, see Whiting 2007b and Whiting 
Forthcoming.   8 
particularist that they have ‘default’ or ‘standard’ meanings.
7 This might seem like 
taking back with one hand what one gives with another. However, for the particularist, 
an expression’s ‘standard’ meaning is not to be viewed as determined by a general 
standard for its employment, but rather by ‘its “common usage”’, by ‘how the 
expression in question has actually been used in the past’ (p. 14). Correlatively, 
understanding that expression, grasping its ‘default’ meaning, is a matter of having 
the right ‘linguistic expectations […] as to what counts as a reasonable projection of 
that term in novel contexts of use’ given its past (pp. 14-5). 
One might wonder why ‘common usage’ could not be in accordance with a 
rule. The particularist’s answer, Bergqvist tells us, is that ‘it is not true that the kind of 
understanding that a competent speaker has in knowing the [standard] meaning of a 
term (as manifested in the way she employs it) can be captured in a specifiable 
semantic rule for correct use’. And the reason for this is supposedly that competent 
language-users are able appropriately to project any given term into (or withhold it 
from) an open-ended range of contexts, and so guidance with respect to those contexts 
cannot be ‘articulated in a specifiable rule’ (pp. 10-11). The particularist typically 
defends such claims by examining examples of semantic rules of the sort the 
generalist might provide and showing that there are cases in which the rule does not 
provide suitable guidance although subjects are able to make appropriate judgements 
as to whether or not the relevant term applies.
8  
Bergqvist summarises a generalist response to this:  
what might initially look like a clear case of fluidity and open-endedness in the 
particularist’s sense is really just a case of under-specification, which a more precise 
rule could make fully explicit. (p. 12) 
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While I accept the spirit of this, I think the letter is in danger of misleading. It is not 
clear that a generalist should claim that semantic rules can be made fully explicit if 
this precludes the use of, say, indexical terms in specifying the rule. Among the rules 
governing the use of an expression might be a rule that one could only articulate by 
saying that the relevant term is (not) to be applied to things like that (along with a 
suitable demonstration). There is a sense in which the rule has not been made ‘fully 
explicit’—the rule is more fine-grained than and is underdetermined by the words 
used to specify it—but to accept that some semantic rules are only specifiable in this 
form is not to forgo generalism. According to generalism, semantic rules hold 
generally for the use of the term they govern—that is, those rules provide guidance 
with respect to the use of an expression generally—which is not to say that one must 
only use general terms in articulating them. 
However one construes it, Bergqvist objects to the generalist’s appeal to 
under-specification. First, she points out that that appeal ‘does nothing to show that 
ascriptions of linguistic competence entail ascriptions of knowledge of some 
specifiable criteria for correct language use’ (p. 12). This is true, but recall the 
dialectic. The particularist is putting forward putative counter-examples to the 
generalist’s examples of semantic rules, counter-examples which the generalist tries 
to explain away by appeal to under-specification. Hence, the generalist is not making 
that appeal so as to prove her thesis but so as to defend it. 
Strategic considerations aside, Bergqvist objects that ‘the generalist’s appeal 
to under-specification does not address the alternative positive suggestion that the 
mark of linguistic competence is simply displayed in the way a competent speaker is 
prepared to project a given term in new directions on future occasions’ (p. 12). Again, 
this is true, but that might be because the generalist has no need to challenge the   10 
positive suggestion. Competence with a semantic rule, she can happily grant, is 
displayed in the way that a subject is prepared (or otherwise) to project a given term.  
Bergqvist continues: 
Moreover, no matter how carefully a putative meaning-rule is formulated, room is 
always left open for contextual variation in determining what counts as satisfying the 
necessary  conditions  for  correct  use  that  the  rule  would  lay  down.  Settling  such 
questions  is  itself  a  contextual  matter,  which  requires  sound  judgement  and 
appreciation of the nature of the speech-situation itself, or so I claim. (p. 13) 
So I claim too. In a paper Bergqvist discusses, I accept the particularist’s observation 
that whether the conditions laid down by a rule for the correct application of an 
expression can be said obtain ‘is itself a circumstantial matter’ (2009, p. 126). But, I 
point out, this hardly shows that no semantic rules are in force, only that ‘operating 
with them requires varying degrees of imagination and judgement, and that they could 
only be applied by creatures with the appropriate sensitivity to the salient features of a 
context’ (2009, p. 131). We have still, then, to reach a point over which the 
particularist and the generalist disagree, and so we have yet to see a consideration that 
might show that the particularist’s account of what constitutes context-independent or 
‘default’ meanings is preferable to or in competition with the generalist’s. 
  Bergqvist is aware that the moderate version of generalism I defend is 
compatible with many of the particularist ideas discussed so far. She characterises my 
view as holding that the meaning of a term ‘need not be seen as determined by fixed 
rules of a formal calculus, but rather by reference to paradigmatic examples, which 
serve as standards for a term’s correct application’ (p. 17). It is certainly correct to 
attribute to me the view that certain ‘examples’ can serve as standards for the correct 
use of certain terms, although perhaps ‘exemplar’ would be a better label for them. 
That said, I do not think (as some of Bergqvist’s remarks seem to suggest) that all   11 
semantic ‘standards’ take this form. In my view, specifications of rules can take a 
variety of forms, depending on the expression such rules govern, and also on the 
needs of the occasion on which the rule is formulated, especially the needs of those to 
whom the formulation is given. As appropriate, one might express a rule using 
general terms, or using singular terms and exemplars of the thing to which the 
relevant word is (not) to be applied, or one might simply present exemplary uses of 
the relevant word that serve as a benchmark for others and from which the rule might 
be gleaned. But this liberal conception of rule formulations is not, I think, central to 
moderate generalism. What is central is the idea that, however they are specified, 
semantic rules do not determine (though they do constrain) what thought is expressed 
in an utterance, in just the same way that the context-independent significance a term 
possesses does not determine (though it does constrain) what thought is expressed in 
an utterance of any sentence involving it. 
  As noted above, Bergqvist recognises this version of generalism. In that case, 
however, it is unclear why she saddles it with the view that semantics is ‘in the 
business of predicting what proposition would be expressed in some given utterance 
of a sentence’ and that ‘such things are predictable’ (p. 19).
9 Denying this is precisely 
what makes room for a moderate generalism that acknowledges holism*, according to 
which the circumstances of utterance, alongside rules, make an ineliminable 
contribution to determining what thought is expressed in an utterance of an expression. 
 
4  Matters of substance 
Let us turn to the example Bergqvist offers with the aim of showing the inadequacy of 
moderate generalism, namely Wittgenstein’s use in the Tractatus of the term 
‘substance’. According to Bergqvist, that use is ‘non-standard’ (p. 21). She writes: 
                                                 
9 Bergqvist is here quoting Travis 2008, p. 152.   12 
On the moderate generalist analysis, granted that Wittgenstein is not using 
‘substance’ incorrectly (nor applies a different, though presumably closely related 
term), the only option left is to say that Wittgenstein is tacitly revising the specifiable 
standards for the correct application of ‘substance’ that determines its invariant core 
meaning. I think this sounds wrong. (p. 22) 
One complication with the exegetical issue Bergqvist draws attention to is that it 
might principally concern how to understand what (if anything) Wittgenstein intends 
his readers to understand by the term ‘substance’. This is a matter of what (if anything) 
a speaker means by the use of an expression, not of what (if any) invariant meaning 
that expression has, or of what (if anything) is literally expressed in its utterance. Thus, 
arguably, the issue is at one remove from the concerns of particularists and generalists. 
Setting this aside, it seems to me that there are any number of things one might 
say about Wittgenstein’s use of the term ‘substance’, in line with generalism, where 
what exactly one should say is not something that one should expect generalism itself 
to decide; it is only to be decided by a careful reading of the Tractatus itself, which 
evidently I cannot attempt here. 
For example, study of the Tractatus might reveal no coherent pattern in the 
use of the term ‘substance’, and so might show the sentences involving that term 
literally to express no thoughts. For the generalist, this would be to find no rules with 
which Wittgenstein’s employment of that term could be perceived to be in accordance 
with. Recall Wittgenstein’s own notorious claim that the remarks of the Tractatus are 
‘nonsensical’ (1974, 6.54), a result of having ‘failed to give a meaning to some of 
[their] constituents’ (1974, 5.4733). 
  Instead, close scrutiny of Wittgenstein’s use of ‘substance’ might reveal it to 
in fact be, by and large, in accordance with established usage, and hence in 
accordance with the rules traditionally governing its use (although of course the   13 
moderate generalist will insist, as a holist*, that what exactly is expressed in that use 
is determined in part by its surroundings). Indeed, one might take this to be the view 
of Michael Morris who, in a recent commentary, claims that Wittgenstein picks up on 
‘a key strand in the traditional (Aristotelian) notion of substance’ (2008, pp. 40-1). 
This possibility is a live one and certainly does not clash with generalism.  
  Alternatively, supposing one grants to Bergqvist that Wittgenstein’s use of 
‘substance’ is indeed non-standard, what is the objection to viewing, in a way 
compatible with generalism, the term ‘substance’ as it occurs in the Tractatus as a 
‘different, though presumably closely related term’ to that found in the tradition, and 
so one governed by different, though presumably closely related rules? Consider Ian 
Proops suggestion, in another recent commentary, that the term that one finds in the 
Tractatus is an ‘analogue’ of Kant’s term ‘substance’ and ‘alludes’ to it (2004, pp. 
109 and 106). A generalist might interpret this as the suggestion that Wittgenstein’s 
‘substance’ is governed by rules that, though distinct, are connected to and call to 
mind those that govern Kant’s term.  
Bergqvist simply does not say why this is not a legitimate possibility. 
Moreover, it is not obvious that this way of viewing the matter differs substantially 
from the way Bergqvist says the moderate generalist must view it. To say that 
Wittgenstein’s expression ‘substance’ is different, though related, to the traditional 
expression is effectively to say that Wittgenstein is revising the standards for the use 
of ‘substance’. One sympathetic to this assessment might take the remarks in which 
Wittgenstein introduces the term (1974, 2.021ff) as precisely seeking to establish such 
novel standards (perhaps exploiting our familiarity with traditional ones). 
While insisting that this is far from the only way for the generalist to ‘analyse’ 
Wittgenstein’s use of the term ‘substance’, and that exactly which analysis should be 
given depends on exegetical matters, I have granted to Bergqvist that, in accordance   14 
with generalism, one might view Wittgenstein as revising the rules for the use of that 
term. What exactly is her objection to this proposal? According to Bergqvist, we need 
to hold on to the idea that Wittgenstein’s allegedly novel use ‘does not change the 
default meaning of “substance” as such’ (p. 22), where the default meaning is not that 
which it is has only in the context of the Tractatus. But why is the moderate generalist 
unable to hold on to this idea? The ‘default’ or traditional meaning, on the generalist 
picture, is determined by the rules traditionally governing the use of ‘substance’. 
Wittgenstein’s novel use, ex hypothesi, institutes slightly different rules but that need 
not affect the rules ‘substance’ is subject to on other, perhaps more traditional, 
occasions. Hence, the moderate generalist can do justice to ‘the intuitive distinction 
between the “standard” meaning of a term like “substance” and the special meaning 
that the term has in the wider context of the Tractatus’ (p. 22-3) on which Bergqvist 
insists. 
  Indeed, arguably it is the particularist that cannot hold on to the above idea. 
Since Wittgenstein’s use of ‘substance’ amounts to a  new chapter in the history of the 
term’s use, and since, according to particularism, that history is determinative of the 
word’s meaning, surely it follows that Wittgenstein’s use changes to some degree the 
‘default’ meaning of ‘substance’. 
In her discussion of Wittgenstein’s use of ‘substance’, Bergqvist once again 
seems to lose sight of the moderate generalist position when she suggests that the 
generalist cannot recognise, with the particularist, that ‘the wider context of the 
Tractatus as a whole enables the term to have a certain semantic significance’ (p. 21). 
First, it is precisely the moderate generalist’s claim that what exactly is expressed in 
the use of an expression is partly determined by the surrounding circumstances. 
Second, the moderate generalist can insist that, if Wittgenstein’s early use of the term   15 
‘substance’ is not according to established rules, the wider context of its employment 
might make clear which rules are operative. 
 
5  Concluding remarks 
I have suggested that the generalist is free to evaluate the particular case Bergqvist 
draws attention to in various ways, and that which is appropriate turns entirely on 
exegetical matters. This suggests that the particularist should not rest her case on how 
generalism copes with specific examples, since those examples will typically be 
underdescribed, leaving the generalist free to fill out the details in a way that accords 
with her view. I suspect that the dispute is best settled by considering the explanatory 
potential of each position and, especially, how each accounts for linguistic 
competence.  
According to particularism, the default meaning of an expression is 
determined by its history. An obvious concern with this suggestion is that competent 
language users are supposed to be sensitive to the default meaning of an expression, 
but for the most part language users are not sensitive to the history of an expression’s 
use. Past utterances (unlike rules) may be, and typically are, beyond the ken of 
subjects for a significant number of expressions.  
Needless to say, so stated, the objection is far from decisive, but it seems to 
me that future discussion should focus on it. The point of the present paper was to 
suggest that generalism can have its cake and eat it; it can acknowledge both the 
particularly general aspects of language—the context-independent semantic rules—
and the generally particular aspects—what is expressed on a given occasion.  
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